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Abstract 
 
Increasingly both donor agencies and recipient governments want to assess the 
effectiveness of aid. Unfortunately, existing methods for impact evaluation are designed 
for the evaluation of homogeneous interventions (‘projects’) where those with and 
without ‘treatment’ can be compared. However, when assessing the effectiveness of 
sector aid or general budget support one is concerned about the impact of numerous 
heterogeneous interventions; there is then no obvious control group. The lack of a 
credible methodology for such high level evaluations is a serious constraint in the debate 
on aid effectiveness.  
We propose a method of statistical impact evaluation in situations with heterogeneous 
interventions, an extension of the double differencing method often used in project 
evaluations. We illustrate its feasibility with an example for the education sector in 
Zambia.  
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Assessing Budget Support with Statistical Impact Evaluation1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction   
 
For many decades discussions on what works and what does not in world 
development have been characterized more by ideology and arm-chair theorizing than 
by appeal to evidence. Public sector interventions in developing countries are rarely 
evidence-based and in policy debates professionals do not enjoy noticeably more 
credibility than self-proclaimed development experts such as rock star Bono. 
However, this is beginning to change: concerns about aid effectiveness have led to a 
demand for higher standards in evaluations of aid-supported interventions (Duflo, 
2005; Tarp, 2006; Gunning 2006) and the enormous improvement in the availability 
of both macro and micro datasets has made it feasible to meet this demand. 
 
That it is feasible to test interventions in development rigorously, much like medical 
drugs are tested, has been argued convincingly and eloquently by many authors. An 
excellent (and very entertaining) introduction to this field is Ravallion (2001) and a 
recent overview is given by Duflo (2005).  
 
                                                 
1
 We are grateful to Jean-Louis Arcand, Arne Bigsten, Antonie de Kemp, Jean-Philippe Platteau, Jacob 
Svensson, Finn Tarp and Rita Tesselaar for many helpful discussions on this topic.     
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Unfortunately, existing evaluation techniques do not meet current demands. 
Statistical impact evaluation methods are designed for ‘projects’, where the 
intervention (‘treatment’ in the jargon) is homogeneous: it is well-defined and 
identical for all members of the ‘treatment group’. This makes it feasible and sensible 
to infer the impact of the intervention from a comparison of a treatment and a control 
group. However, nowadays the evaluation question is often quite different. Donors 
have started to move away from project finance in favor of sector aid and general 
budget support. As a result, ironically, donor agencies are becoming interested in 
statistical impact evaluation techniques (designed for narrowly defined projects) at 
the very time when their evaluation demands have shifted, making these existing 
techniques unsuitable. This has led to methodological confusion. Donors want to 
assess the effectiveness of aid at the sector or national level but it is not clear how this 
should be done.    
 
In this paper we address this dilemma. We argue that existing statistical impact 
evaluation techniques can be modified in such a way that they become suitable for 
sector or general budget support evaluations. The methodology we propose requires 
“intervention histories” for a representative sample of the target population. For 
example, in an education sector evaluation one would need to have data at the level of 
schools on the nature and timing of government controlled school and teacher 
characteristics, e.g. the availability of textbooks and the level of training of the 
teachers. In many developing countries education ministries already maintain data 
bases with this type of information.  The intervention histories have to be 
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complemented with impact measures at the level of schools, e.g. the quality of 
schooling as measured by exam scores or standardized national assessments. The 
proposed methodology then involves a regression of exam scores on the intervention 
history variables. The regression results can be used to obtain an estimate of the 
aggregate impact of all the various schooling interventions. The feasibility of this 
approach has now been established in a number of evaluation studies.2   
 
It should be emphasized that the method provides an ex post assessment: it addresses 
the question (relevant for both donors and recipient governments) whether the money 
spent on, say, education in a particular period was well spent in the sense that it 
achieved a significant and substantial improvement in terms of exam results. This is 
different from the issue in an ex ante evaluation where one is concerned about the 
future impact of current allocations to the sector. The results of ex ante evaluations 
can, of course, inform ex post evaluations but it is useful to keep the distinction in 
mind.  For example, investment in education may have been highly successful in the 
past but because of diminishing returns an ex ante evaluation may indicate that 
continuing the same types of investment will have much less impact.    
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss recent developments 
in statistical impact evaluation and the shift in donor demands towards evaluations at 
a much higher level than that of individual projects. We present and discuss our 
methodological proposal in section 3. In section 4 we use some results from a recent 
                                                 
2
 The authors are involved in evaluations of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs of water and sanitation 
in Tanzania, education in Zambia and water supply in Yemen. 
 5 
evaluation of primary education in Zambia to illustrate how the method can be used. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Statistical Impact Evaluation3 
 
There are few public sector activities which are so often and so intensively evaluated 
as development aid. Nevertheless there still is remarkably little systematic evidence 
on what does and does not work in development. The apparent contradiction is easily 
resolved. The vast majority of development evaluations are focused on process rather 
than on impact and on recording changes rather than on attribution of observed 
changes to interventions. Consultants who specialize in evaluations of development 
activities are usually very good in establishing what happened and why. They report, 
of course, to what extent targets were achieved but typically they do not attempt to 
establish rigorously whether observed changes can be attributed to the intervention. 
As a result the fundamental evaluation question: what and how much was achieved as 
a result of this intervention? usually remains unanswered. This is changing rapidly: 
the debate on aid effectiveness has caused a surge of interest in better evidence and 
hence in formal impact evaluation techniques.4  Often these techniques can indicate 
not only whether the intervention had an effect but also the size of that effect. They 
                                                 
3
 This section draws on Gunning (2006). 
4
 There is some terminological confusion here since in the evaluation literature the term impact is used in 
two different senses. It sometimes denotes the effect of an intervention in terms of ultimate objectives such 
as poverty alleviation or improved literacy. (If used in this sense it is contrasted with inputs or intermediate 
results which in the jargon are designated as outputs or outcomes.) Alternatively, in the statistical literature 
impact evaluation refers to any statistical assessment of the effects of an intervention. There then is no 
presumption that these effects are measured in terms of ultimate objectives. In principle statistical impact 
evaluation could focus on results in terms of outputs or outcomes. 
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therefore provide a quantitative assessment which can be used in a cost-benefit 
analysis.  
 
Impact evaluation relies on comparing groups with and without ‘treatment’. However, 
obviously, no group can be observed at the same time in both situations. This is the 
fundamental evaluation problem. It forces the evaluator to construct a control group 
in such a way that the results for this group can be used as the results for the 
hypothetical case when the “treatment group” would in fact not have received 
treatment. Rather than comparing the same group with and without treatment at the 
same time (which is impossible) one compares results for two different groups. (The 
hypothetical nature of the counterfactual is sometimes used as an argument against 
statistical impact evaluation: the methodology is then dismissed because it requires 
estimates of what would have happened in a hypothetical situation. This objection 
simply ignores the evaluation problem.)    
 
Ideally, impact evaluation involves the comparison of two randomly selected groups, 
a treatment and a control group. This is the experimental design familiar from, for 
example, the testing of medical drugs. In this setup the control group provides the 
counterfactual: since participants in the experiment have been assigned randomly to 
the two groups, there is no reason to suppose that there are any (statistically 
significant) differences between the two groups other than that one group is exposed 
to treatment while the other one is not. The control group can therefore be used to 
infer what would have happened to the members of the treatment group in the 
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hypothetical case when they would have received no treatment. Any significant 
differences in results between the two groups can therefore be attributed to the 
treatment.  
 
Random assignment is often not feasible but if it is (e.g. because an intervention is 
implemented sequentially so that there is scope for randomization in the order in 
which, say, different locations are given treatment) then it certainly should be used 
(Duflo, 2005).    
 
In policy evaluations one often has to accept non-random assignment. Consider the 
case of an evaluation of an employment promotion policy, say a training program. A 
traditional evaluation would simply rely on before-and-after comparisons: did a group 
of unemployed workers succeed in finding jobs after participating in a training 
program? Such comparisons clearly suffer from a selection effect. If candidates self-
selected themselves into the program then their success in finding  a job need not 
reflect the impact of the training: those who signed up for the program might have 
(unobserved) characteristics that made them more likely than others to find jobs in the 
absence of the programs. Clearly, a before-and-after evaluation is then meaningless. 
If the evaluator is not allowed to assign workers randomly to the two groups then he 
has to correct for selection effects. Labor market research has a strong tradition of 
using rigorous statistical impact evaluation to construct convincing counterfactuals 
for such cases (Heckman et al., 1999).  
 
 8 
In development the use of such evaluation methods is more recent, but the last decade 
has seen numerous applications in evaluations of social safety nets (e.g. Newman et 
al., 2002), schooling programs targeted at the poor (Sadoulet et al., 2001), health 
interventions (Pradhan et al., 2007) and even rural empowerment programs (Janssens, 
2007). As in the case of labor market evaluations, work in this area has moved from 
its initial research focus to practical applications. Both NGOs and bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies are now experimenting with such methods. Indeed, even 
quite small donor agencies have started to use these techniques. One of the best-
known evaluations (Miguel and Kremer, 2004) describes an evaluation of primary 
schooling in Kenya which was initiated by a small NGO, ICS Africa.  
 
In the absence of random assignment there may be systematic differences between the 
two groups. One can often correct for the resulting bias in the evaluation (with 
methods such as propensity score matching, see e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) if 
the differences are measured but there may well be unobserved differences. The 
availability of baseline data is then of crucial importance. If baseline data are 
available then one can measure changes over time for both groups rather than 
measuring differences at time t (after “treatment”) between the two groups. Impact 
can then be assessed as the difference between the two groups in those changes over 
time (“differences in differences” or “double differencing”). The method can easily 
be extended to a multi-period context. This is important since in many practical 
situations the target group is affected not just by current interventions but also by 
previous interventions. Such lagged effects need to be taken into account.  
 9 
 
Policy makers are understandably reluctant to invest in the collection of baseline data 
but there is a growing awareness that without such data it is quite difficult to assess 
the results of an intervention in a convincing way. Also, policy makers increasingly 
accept that where implementation of an intervention is gradual (e.g. 25% coverage of 
the villages concerned in the first year, 50% in the second year and so on) there is a 
strong case for using random assignment of villages to the various rounds of 
implementation.5 
 
When statistical impact evaluation is used at the project level treatment is well 
defined and the same for all members of the control group. Also, it is clear from the 
project’s objectives how success is to be defined. For example, if the project involves 
offering cash transfers to poor households conditional on the (continued) school 
enrolment of their children then this intervention is the same for all households in the 
target group.6 Given the project’s objective its impact should obviously be measured 
in terms of enrolment of children in the target group. Many development 
interventions fall into this category of specific activities with obvious success 
indicators. If donors support such activities then they can use statistical impact 
evaluation. (But, of course, there may be fungibility: the project evaluated may not be 
what the donor in fact financed.) 
 
                                                 
5
 Since the implementation of the intervention is gradual in any case, the usual moral objection to 
randomization does not apply. If one is not going to extend the treatment to the entire target group 
instantaneously anyway then random assignment of the initial beneficiaries would seem to be equitable. 
6
 An example of such an evaluation is discussed at length in Ravallion (2001). 
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However, in recent years donors have moved away from project aid. Increasingly aid 
is given as sector support or general budget support. This is problematic for assessing 
aid effectiveness: the evaluation question must now be considered at a higher level of 
aggregation, a level for which the techniques of statistical impact evaluation have not 
been designed. This has contributed to methodological confusion. NGOs and donor 
agencies are under great pressure to demonstrate the effectiveness of their work but 
they are not sure how sector aid or general budget support can be evaluated.   
 
One approach is to measure the impact of aid through cross-country growth 
regressions. Inter-country variance is then used to estimate the impact (in terms of 
changes in poverty, income or economic growth) of total aid (or its various 
components) on economic growth. Implicitly, the experience of other countries is 
then used to construct a counterfactual whereby one controls as much as possible for 
inter-country differences other than those in aid receipts.  
 
This is an active (and somewhat controversial) area of research.7 Results are far from 
settled and much of the work in this area fails to pass tests of robustness.8 In addition 
to econometric weaknesses this approach has the disadvantage that it generates very 
limited information. Most importantly, it does not indicate the relative effectiveness 
of the various aid-supported activities (e.g. education versus water supply), 
                                                 
7
 The father of growth theory, Robert Solow, provides a thoughtful critique of growth regressions in Solow 
(2002). He is critical of the assumption that the same specification applies to all countries so that 
differences in growth rates can only be explained by differences across countries in the values of the 
regressors used.  
8
 See Bigsten et al. (2006) and Tarp (2006) for discussion and references.  
 11 
information which both donors and recipient governments hope to obtain from an 
evaluation.   
 
An alternative to cross-country regressions is to rely on case studies. This was the 
approach adopted in a recent ambitious evaluation of general budget support (Joint 
Evaluation, 2005). In this massive study counterfactual analysis remained informal: 
the evaluators used their judgment in assessing the plausibility of various alternative 
scenarios. As a result there is no hope of achieving a quantitative estimate of the 
impact of general budget support on poverty. The preliminary synthesis report 
recognizes this: “we cannot confidently track distinct [budget support] effects to this 
[poverty impact] level in most countries”.9 
  
Cross-county regressions and case studies therefore have severe limitations. In this 
paper we propose an alternative: to apply statistical impact evaluation but in such a 
way that conclusions can be drawn at a higher level than that of the individual project. 
This is still largely virgin territory. The methodology for statistical impact evaluation 
at the project level is well established but such methods have only just started to be 
used to assess sector support.10 
 
How can it be done? Our proposal (discussed at greater length in the next section) 
involves three steps. First, a random sample is drawn, representative of the population. 
For example, in the case of education one might draw a sample of schools and make 
                                                 
9
 Joint evaluation (2005, p. 16) as quoted in Bigsten et al. (2006). 
10
 The evaluation agency of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IOB) has started a series of such 
evaluation studies to test the feasibility of this approach. 
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the probability of being included in the sample proportional to the population size of a 
school’s catchment area. In the second step, intervention histories are collected for the 
sample schools. This is a record of policy-induced changes at the school level: 
availability of text books, the number of toilet facilities for girls, the number of class 
rooms, and the level of training of the head of the school and so on. Sometimes these 
data will have to be collected at the schools but often they will already be available in 
data bases at the Ministry of Education or at district or provincial government centers. 
In addition school level data need to be collected on results (e.g. the exam scores of 
the pupils of the sample schools) and of variables which may have influences these 
results (other than the policy variables). The final step then involves a regression of 
changes in exam scores on changes in policy variables (as identified in the 
intervention histories) and on changes in other explanatory variables. To take an 
example from another sector: if one is interested in the health effects of a water 
supply program, one would want to regress changes in a location-specific health 
measure (e.g. incidence of a water-related disease such as cholera) on changes in all 
possible determinants of that incidence including the location’s water supply 
characteristics.11  
 
Applying statistical impact evaluation to a whole set of activities can be described as 
a bottom up approach: impact is measured at the level of the ultimate beneficiaries. 
                                                 
11
 Just as in statistical impact evaluation at the project level one will have to deal with the non-random 
assignment of the treatment variables. This may involve, for instance, using the Heckman method to model 
the selection effect. Whether such a correction is needed depends on the purpose of the evaluation. If the 
question is whether the money allocated to the sector was well spent taking as given the political processes 
which might bias the allocation of that money across interventions and across locations then a correction 
would be inappropriate. For a technical discussion of this point see Elbers and Gunning (2007). This is a 
situation which often arises in practice: the donor can shift money between sectors but is powerless to 
influence the within-sector allocation processes. 
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An important advantage of this approach is that it will reveal differences in returns 
between various government activities. For example, some types of schooling 
programs may turn out to be much more effective than others. The evaluation is then 
informative not only on the average return on educational spending, but also on 
whether the portfolio of activities within the sector is efficient. This is important: if 
efficiency is rejected then there is scope for raising effectiveness by expanding some 
activities at the expense of others. The same applies to differences in returns across 
(rather than within) sectors. Information on these differences can be used to raise the 
aggregate return by changing the allocation of resources across activities. (This is 
analogous to the approach in the aid allocation literature where differences in aid 
effectiveness between countries are used to raise aggregate effectiveness; Collier and 
Dollar, 2002.)  
 
It should be noted that under a “common pool” approach the interventions evaluated 
cannot be associated with any particular donor. What we propose will provide an 
assessment of the effectiveness of a set of interventions (possibly all interventions in 
a particular sector and period). If donors have supported these activities by 
contributing to, say, the budget of a particular ministry it would be sensible to 
attribute the effect of those interventions to donors in proportion to their contribution. 
 
Many evaluations follow a log frame approach where inputs are seen as leading to 
impact via the intermediate outputs and outcomes. It is appealing to follow this 
logical sequence in the evaluation. Instead, our approach directly relates impact 
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variables to inputs, thereby bypassing the output and outcome variables. Statistically 
this amounts to estimating a reduced form rather than a structural model. There are 
two reasons to prefer the reduced form approach which we advocate over the log 
frame approach. First, the log frame amounts to estimating a structural model. It 
assumes implicitly that one is certain about which variables appear in each of the 
structural equations and, conversely, about the exclusion restrictions. In effect the 
model is exactly identified. This is convenient but implies that there is no room left 
for testing the assumptions on the variables to be included or excluded. While the 
theory summarized in the log frame may be plausible, situations where there is no 
doubt as to exclusion restrictions must be extremely rare. We therefore prefer to 
estimate a reduced form without committing ourselves to whether all the regressors 
considered belong in the equation, let alone to restrictions which would enable us to 
recover all the structural coefficients.  Secondly, and related, there may simply not be 
enough instruments available to deal with endogeneity in each of the structural 
equations. In that case the log frame is a useful device for organizing one’s thoughts 
but no more: estimating each of the structural relations identified in the log frame is 
simply not possible.12      
 
 3. Heterogeneity of “Treatment”: Beyond Binary Evaluation 
 
The basic idea of our proposal is to evaluate sector-wide policy by linking an 
exhaustive set of sector-related interventions to an exhaustive set of objectives. The 
                                                 
12
 Elbers and Gunning (2006) provide an example of this for an evaluation of the health effects of water 
supply and sanitation programs. 
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term ‘intervention’ should be interpreted here in a broad sense: it does not only 
consist of special projects, but includes regular policy, inputs and procedures.  
Typically interventions are not uniformly applied in a sector and they will change 
over time. The way to identify the impact of overall policy and of policy components 
is to compare differences in interventions across the sector as well as changes over 
time to differences and changes in outcomes. This requires a dataset representative of 
interventions and outcomes at the level of the ultimate beneficiary of policy: the 
individual. For example, in an evaluation of primary education we look at what 
happens at the level of the individual pupil: what is the size of classes, how many text 
books are available for each pupil, etc. Hence, it is natural to sample schools and 
collect data on policy variables affecting pupils as well as outcomes such as 
enrolment or test scores. 
 
Looking only at the policy variables that are observable at the level of the ultimate 
beneficiary necessarily excludes some interventions that might well be very effective.  
A sector-wide administrative reform could boost the effectiveness of teaching without 
being directly observable at the pupil level. The effect of the reform could be traced 
along two channels. First, it could also affect pupils in some way, e.g. in the form of 
better-trained or motivated teachers, less teacher absenteeism, etc.  Thus the impact of 
the administrative reform could be inferred from the impact of teacher training and 
the total improvement of teacher qualification etc.  Second, it could affect the sector 
by reducing the cost of education, thus improving the benefit/cost ratio of the sector. 
In this paper we do not discuss this second channel.  
 16 
 
A regression model incorporating these ideas looks as follows. Let outcome 
variable itY  depend on a vector of policy variables itP , some control variables itX  not 
related to policy and a ‘disturbance’ term i itµ ε+  explained below: 
 .it it it i itY a bP cX µ ε= + + + +  (1) 
Here i denotes the unit of the analysis (the school, or the pupil), and t the time of 
observation. Say there are two observations for each unit, denoted 0t =  and 1.t =  A 
good measure for the impact of policy variables is the coefficient vector b, so the 
evaluation problem is reduced to estimating b.13 Typically, the coefficient vector b 
cannot be estimated by means of simple OLS regression. The disturbance term i itµ ε+ , 
representing all variables omitted from the analysis, allows for a ‘fixed’ (i.e., constant 
over time) effect iµ  reflecting the possibility that units differ in outcomes even if they 
do not differ in P or X. Such fixed effects are known to invalidate the results of 
simple regression techniques, in particular when they are correlated with intervention 
variables.14 One way to deal with fixed effects is to ‘difference’ the regression 
equation:15 
 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0( ) ( ) ( ),i i i i i i i iY Y a b P P c X X ε ε− = + − + − + −  (2) 
                                                 
13
 The total effect of the policy in period t is then given by iti PbΣˆ . In a cost-benefit analysis this would 
have to be converted to a monetary value and compared with the cost of the policy. 
14
 For a technical discussion of fixed effects, see e.g. Verbeek (2000, chapter 10). 
 
15
 Besley and Burgess (2000) use a reduced form equation similar to equation (1). They have data for 30 
years and are therefore able to estimate fixed effects at the level of the primary sampling unit so that there 
is no need for differencing. In sector evaluations time series are often quite short necessitating the 
differencing method we adopt in equation (2).      
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so that the fixed effect drops out of the equation.16  In principle, this can be repeated 
for every outcome variable Y of interest. The vector of impact coefficients b can now 
be estimated consistently if P and X (or rather their change) are uncorrelated to the 
(change) in the disturbance termε .  An alternative sufficient condition for consistent 
estimation of b is that P reflects truly exogenous policy.17 
 
Equation (2) is formally similar to the familiar ‘difference-in-differences’ estimator of 
more conventional policy evaluation. However, there are important differences. 
Statistical impact evaluation is designed for binary situations: for every individual in 
the sample it is clear whether she was in the treatment or in the control group. 
Moreover, care is often taken to make sure that treatment is the same for all treated 
individuals. To take an example from the education sector, the intervention to be 
evaluated might be a conditional cash transfer program (active for a limited period) 
and the treatment group would consist of the households receiving transfers. Many of 
the evaluation methods discussed in the previous section are designed for such 
“binary” interventions. (Dose-response models of course allow for continuous effects.) 
In terms of the regression equation above, the ‘vector’ of policy variables itP  would 
be a binary number, equaling 1 for treated and 0 for non-treated individuals. 
 
Unfortunately, a set-up like this cannot be used to evaluate support for sector 
programmes or general budget support. For instance, an educational policy package 
                                                 
16
 This can be generalized to the case of more than two observations per unit. 
17
 The policy variables in P are not likely to be exogenous in the regression unless they contain essentially 
all relevant policy interventions affecting the ultimate beneficiaries of policy. Leaving out an important 
policy variable will lead to omitted variable bias on coefficients of variables that are included in the 
regression.  
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contains many interventions such as construction of schools, provision of teaching 
materials, training of teachers, cash transfers to increase enrolment, affecting the 
ultimate beneficiary – the pupil – in many ways and in different degrees. In principle 
one could imagine doing a separate evaluation for each policy intervention and add 
up the results of each to determine the impact of a policy package. However, results 
for individual interventions are bound to be affected by the presence and intensity of 
other policy interventions as well. A more promising evaluation strategy is therefore 
to exploit policy heterogeneity: schools will differ both in what they benefited from 
and when and this can be the basis for determining the effectiveness of individual 
interventions by means of a regression equation such as equation (2). 
 
Of course, estimating the impact of policy in this way breaks down if a policy 
instrument is the same for all observation units. For instance, national legislation that 
affects enrollment in schools is the same for all schools. Therefore the impact of  
the legislation cannot be separated from the effect of the constant a in equation (2). A 
somewhat different difficulty arises if a policy affects several outcome variables and 
one would like to assess the impact of a policy on an outcome net of the effect on 
other outcomes. For instance, an increase in the number of teachers in a school could 
be expected to increase both enrollments (because parents expect better education for 
their children) and improve exam results (through a decline in the pupil-to-teacher 
ratio).  However, the impact on enrollment counteracts the decline in the pupil-to-
teacher ratio leading to a reduced (or even perverse) effect of the increase in the 
number of teachers on exam results. Clearly, this ultimate effect is the proper one for 
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evaluating sector policy, but one might still want to know what the impact of an 
increase in teachers is when the effect on enrollment is controlled for. 
 
4. Example: Education in Zambia 
As an example we consider the effect of educational inputs on schooling 
achievements (English exam scores) in primary education in Zambia. In Zambia the 
Ministry of Education has data for all primary schools in the country. These cover 
school characteristics (number of classrooms, toilet facilities, availability of textbooks 
etc.) as well as teacher characteristics (education, professional training, experience).  
These data indicate enormous heterogeneity in terms of school characteristics. From a 
research point of view this is highly attractive: the differences between schools allow 
us to identify the effect of policy interventions. The Ministry data have been linked at 
school level to data from the Exam Council of Zambia for grade 7 pupils taking 
exams in English and mathematics. We consider the exam scores as our measure of 
impact and the question is to what extent these can be explained by school and 
teacher characteristics.  
Most of our data are for 2003 (t = 0) and 2006 (t = 1). School characteristics (but not 
exam scores) are also available for 2002.  In line with equation (2) we regress 
changes in English exam scores (2003-6) on changes in the log of: the number of 
English textbooks, the number of classrooms, the number of teachers and, in addition, 
on changes in an index of the professional quality of the heads teacher and changes in 
a dummy indicating the availability of flush toilets (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Determinants of English Exam Scores (reduced form regression).  
 
   Coefficient  Rob SE t P>|t| 
     
 Log of English Books (06-03)  0.243 0.146 1.67 0.096 
 Log of Classes (06-03)  0.382 0.276 1.39 0.166 
 Log of Teachers (06-03)  -0.531 0.386 -1.38 0.168 
 Professional Quality of Head Teacher (06-03)  0.275 0.307 0.90 0.371 
 Toilets Available (06-03)  0.305 0.509 0.60 0.550 
 Trend (06-03) 0.129 0.057 2.27 0.023 
     
     
Dependent variable: changes in exam scores (2003-6). R-square = 0.005. Number of observations: 
2699. Robust standard errors are denoted Rob SE. Changes in the period 2003-2006 are denoted 06-03. 
 
 
The results of this initial regression are quite disappointing: the fit is poor and at the 
5% level none of the policy variables are statistically significant. Only the time trend 
is significant. This is in itself an encouraging result, indicating that (controlling for 
the observed changes in educational inputs included in the regression) exam scores 
are improving over time. 
 
Recall that we have chosen a reduced form specification. This implies that the effect 
of the number of teachers (treated as an exogenous policy variable) is the total effect. 
This includes not only the direct effect of the number of teachers (with more teachers 
pupils presumably get more attention and therefore achieve better exam scores) but 
also the indirect effect: a higher number of teachers may make the school attractive to 
parents and therefore increase enrolment. However, enrolment will (controlling for 
the number of teachers and other school inputs) have a negative effect on the quality 
of teaching. Our reduced form estimate therefore measures the net effect of two 
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opposing effects. We cannot even be sure of the sign of the net effect. (In the Table 1 
regression it is negative.) 
 
If we want to estimate the direct and indirect effect separately we must add 
enrollment as a regressor but take into account that that this variable is likely to be 
endogenous. We therefore instrument for enrolment. Table 2 shows a first stage 
regression with the change in log enrollment in the period 2003-2006 as the 
dependent variable.18  Here we treat variables such as the availability of school books 
as exogenous policy variables and variables measured in 2002 as predetermined.19  
(The use of level variables to explain changes over time is similar to the use of initial 
conditions in empirical growth analysis.)   We find a highly significant effect of 
policy variables on enrolment, notably of the number of teachers and textbook 
availability.  
 
Table 2: Determinants of Enrollment  
 
   Coefficient  Rob SE t P>|t| 
     
 Log of English Books (06-03)  0.009 0.005 1.890 0.059 
 Log of Classes (06-03)  0.030 0.010 3.090 0.002 
 Log of Teachers (06-03)  0.067 0.012 5.730 0.000 
 Professional Quality of Head Teacher (06-03)  0.002 0.012 0.170 0.868 
 Toilets Available (06-03)  -0.012 0.027 -0.430 0.666 
 Trend  0.180 0.023 7.860 0.000 
 Log of English Books (02)  0.002 0.004 0.400 0.686 
 Log of Classes (02)  -0.006 0.012 -0.490 0.625 
 Log of Pupils Enrolled (02)  -0.075 0.014 -5.540 0.000 
 Log of Teachers (02)  0.025 0.010 2.410 0.016 
 Professional Quality of Head Teacher (02)  0.004 0.014 0.290 0.770 
                                                 
18
 The regressors include both level variables for 2002 (denoted 02) and changes over time (denoted by 03-
06). 
19
 Econometrically the 2002 variables provide identification since they are not included in the second stage 
regression. 
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 Toilets Available (02)  -0.029 0.020 -1.430 0.152 
     
 
Dependent variable: change in log enrollment (2003-6). R-square = 0.32. Number of 
observations: 2495. Robust standard errors are denoted Rob SE. Changes in the period 2003-
2006 are denoted 06-03, level variables for 2002 by 02. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of English Exam Scores (IV regression).  
 
 
 
   Coefficient   Rob SE t   P>|t| 
     
 Log of English Books (06-03)  0.308 0.157 1.960 0.050 
 Log of Classes (06-03)  0.740 0.331 2.240 0.025 
 Log of Pupils Enrolled (06-03)  -10.974 3.957 -2.770 0.006 
 Log of Teachers (06-03)  0.237 0.540 0.440 0.661 
 Professional Quality of Head Teacher (06-03)  0.336 0.328 1.020 0.306 
 Toilets Available (06-03)  0.190 0.850 0.220 0.823 
 Trend (06-03)  0.670 0.178 3.770 0.000 
 
Dependent variable: the change (2003-6) in English exam scores (school averages). Number 
of observations: 2495. Robust standard errors are denoted Rob SE. Changes in the period 
2003-2006 are denoted 06-03. IV-regression: enrollment as predicted by the Table 2 
regression.  
 
 
In Table 3 we regress exam scores on the same policy variables as in Table 1 but now 
in addition on enrollment (where we use the values predicted by the Table 2 
regression). This dramatically changes the results. 
  
The results indicate that exam scores are positively related to availability of textbooks 
and to the number of classrooms and negatively to school enrolment. These three 
effects are significant. Head teacher quality, the number of teachers and toilet 
availability have no significant effect on exam scores. In the case of the number of 
teachers this implies that the direct effect is quite weak, unlike the indirect effect: in 
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Table 2 the variable has a t-score of 5.7. Hence in Zambia the number of teachers 
matters for enrolment, but not (directly) for exam scores.  
 
It may be noted that the effect of the policy instruments is quite small. For example, 
(since the mean exam score is about 30) the coefficient on books amounts to an 
elasticity of only 0.01. (This is not to say that textbook availability is unimportant but 
rather that schools are very heterogeneous in terms of the use they make of available 
books.)  Similar small effects have been reported in the literature, e.g. Hanushek 
(1995).  The most striking finding is the very large (negative) effect of enrollment on 
exam scores, corresponding to an elasticity of about one third.  
 
The Zambian results are interesting in themselves. In the period considered (2003-6) 
primary school enrolment grew enormously: the gross rate went from 8 to 109%, the 
net rate from 78 to 96%. Our results indicate that this generated (as expected) a 
reduction in quality, as measured by exam scores. Nevertheless, the increase in 
enrolment in such a short period is in itself a very impressive achievement.   Here our 
purpose is simply to show that it is feasible to use statistical impact evaluation to 
assess the impact of heterogeneous interventions, as in the case of an evaluation of 
the education sector.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Increasingly donors are expected to demonstrate the effectiveness of aid. They have 
responded with evaluations at a high level of aggregation, e.g. using cross-country 
growth regressions or country case studies to assess the impact of aid on economic 
growth or poverty.20 In this paper we have proposed a bottom-up approach whereby 
the impacts of general budget support or aid-supported sector programmes (or indeed 
sector policies more generally, whether aid-supported or not) are assessed on the 
basis of its impact on a representative sample of the target group. 
 
The proposed methodology can be used to estimate impact parameters for various 
types of interventions. These can be used in cost-benefit analyses of sector policies. 
They can also be used to study the relative effectiveness of different types of 
interventions in the same sector. The methodology is backward looking and is 
therefore suitable for estimating the effect of past interventions. Whether such ex post 
assessments can be used for ex ante evaluations has to be decided in each individual 
case.21  
 
We have presented estimates for primary education in Zambia to illustrate the 
feasibility of the approach. We found that the number of teachers has no significant 
direct effect on quality (as measured by exam scores), that the effect of the number of 
                                                 
20
 Examples are the many papers by World Bank or IMF staff, e.g. Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005). 
21
 For example, if cohort effects in education are important, the marginal effect of educational resources 
may be below the average effect picked up in an ex post evaluation. 
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classrooms and the availability of textbook is significant (but quite weak) and, most 
strikingly, that enrolment has a strong (negative) effect on educational quality.  
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